No Third Class Processes for Foreigners by Davis, Benjamin G.
Copyright  2008  by  Northwestern  University  School  of  Law Vol.  103 





NO THIRD CLASS PROCESSES FOR FOREIGNERS 
Benjamin G. Davis* 
Professor McNeal‘s analysis begins by looking at two conflicting statu-
tory provisions regarding military commissions: one provision allowing a 
political appointee as Convening Authority, and another providing trial 
counsel with enhanced protection from undue influence.1  He sees this inte-
raction as permitting politicization of the trial procedures.  Professor 
McNeal urges the exclusion of political influence from the Convening Au-
thority, by either placing a military officer with existing courts-martial re-
sponsibilities in this role or, alternatively, creating a joint Convening 
Authority.  He also urges Congress to bolster the independence of the trial 
counsel so that they are not subject to the evaluation of higher-ups who 
have an interest in the outcome of trials.  He urges transparent rulemaking, 
according to procedures that are at least as protective as those required for 
promulgating rules in courts-martial. 
In the second part of his essay, Professor McNeal describes a series of 
obstacles impeding a transition to a National Security Court.  He highlights 
the nonprosecution paradox as well as intelligence problems, and posits 
three transitional obstacles to a National Security Court: (1) challenges 
posed by accommodating speedy trial rights in light of security clearances 
and secured facilities, (2) authorities governing the methods by which intel-
ligence is gathered and used, and (3) the phenomenon of executive forum-
discretion.2  Professor McNeal is admirable in avoiding ―a clean slate view‖ 
by steering away from the tendency to be prospective, and instead focusing 
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ble detainees currently in custody.3  He urges that reformers must recognize 
the corrections identified, which he considers to be necessary for the con-
tinued use of military commissions.  Today, post-Hamdan4 and post-
Boumediene,5 Professor McNeal suggests how to improve the military 
commissions.  Part I of this Essay asserts that the flaws in the structure of 
the military commissions are intentional and explains why such a flawed 
structure was established.  Part II discusses the military commissions‘ third 
class processes.  Part III explores the troubling example of the Hamdan mil-
itary commission, and Part IV asserts that attempts to reform the military 
commissions will be fruitless.  Part V suggests using a different perspective 
for establishing procedures for trying terror suspects. 
I. POST 9/11 PANIC AND IMPROVIZATION 
Professor McNeal‘s paper brought me back to 2005 when the operative 
Military Commissions were those established pursuant to a Presidential 
Military Order from 2001.6  I had the opportunity to meet Major General 
John D. Altenburg (Ret.) (who was then the Appointing Authority under the 
scheme that was struck down in Hamdan) at a conference held at Duke.  I 
felt that I was dealing with a person who reflected the finest traditions of 
our military, of patriotism in time of war, and of the legal profession.  His 
willingness to take on that difficult task remains admirable.  I have felt 
those same feelings of admiration for Professor McNeal and his work as an 
academic consultant to Colonel Morris Davis—the former Chief Prosecu-
tor, Department of Defense Office of Military Commissions—and for Co-
lonel Davis himself.  Each of these persons has appeared to me to be ―a 
good man in a bad spot,‖ the words I used to describe General Altenburg 
when I spoke to him in 2005. 
It is because of this deep respect for Professor McNeal and others like 
him that I feel compelled to suggest a different path in this reply.  I believe 
that Professor McNeal‘s analysis aptly highlights some structural problems 
and concerns with a movement toward a national security court.  However, 
I suggest that the military commissions are intentionally structured in this 
manner in order to render separate and unequal third class justice (as com-
pared with Article III courts (first class justice) or courts-martial (second 
class justice)) and forestall or prevent criminal liability for key Executive 
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that Professor McNeal identifies are actually features specifically adopted 
to ensure that third class justice can be rendered to the eighty triable detai-
nees so that they can be sentenced to long terms in prison or death.  Rather 
than think of the eighty triable detainees as obstacles to the arrival at a na-
tional security court, it might be better to see them as the guinea pigs for a 
military commission system designed as a transparent attempt to rid them of 
existence. 
One must understand that these commissions are departures from those 
used historically, where the local courts were not open to hear cases or jus-
tice needed to be rendered in a war zone or occupied zone.8  The imperfec-
tions of military commissions in those settings were balanced by the lack of 
viable alternative processes.  The present military commissions are different 
post hoc creatures.  Since 9/11, through its efforts to isolate from any law 
the persons concerned, the Executive has attempted to place detainees in a 
legal no man‘s land.  When courts have asserted a legal framework, the Ex-
ecutive and the Legislature have attempted to circumvent the spirit, if not 
the letter, of relevant Supreme Court decisions.  With Boumediene, the Su-
preme Court pried open the cover and forced in the requirement of habeas 
corpus review, but the ―hydraulic pressure‖9 to keep these persons in this 
separate and unequal process is significant and bipartisan.  Even with Bou-
mediene, the Executive and Legislature exert pressure to ensure that habeas 
corpus does not disturb the progress and the results of the third class 
process for these eighty triable detainees. 
II. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL THIRD CLASS PROCESSES 
The Executive, and later the Legislature, attempted to establish a her-
metically sealed system in which detainees are unable to avail themselves 
of any other law or process as they are moved along to conviction and inde-
finite confinement or execution.  The drafters of the Military Commission 
Act of 2006 (MCA) appear to be separating these types of military commis-
sions from international law, domestic courts-martial, domestic courts, from 
other types of traditional military commissions, and, essentially, any other 
law.  Ultimately, these alien unlawful enemy combatants are human beings, 
who are being stripped of the protection of all the laws but one—the MCA.  
It becomes readily apparent that this group of people, consistent with a pol-
icy of cruelty, is considered worthy of only ―special‖ processes—separate 
and unequal third class procedures. 
                                                                                                                           
policy—which may aptly be labeled a ‗policy of cruelty‘—violated our founding values, our constitu-
tional system and the fabric of our laws, our over-arching foreign policy interests, and our national secu-
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Nothing indicates a waning of the bipartisan support in the current ex-
ecutive and legislative branches for continuing to shuffle these people into 
such a conviction container.  On the contrary, the continuing revelations of 
the extensive efforts to further the central characteristic of the post-9/11 
policy towards detainees—a policy of cruelty10—make the conviction con-
tainer increasingly necessary for members of the executive and legislative 
branches involved in designing, planning, and implementing this policy.  I 
recognize that the Boumediene majority has to some extent loosened the 
seal by permitting more judicial scrutiny of these detainee cases through 
habeas corpus proceedings.  However, because of their need to hide their 
actions allowing and even ordering torture, I am not sanguine about the wil-
lingness of the Executive and the Legislature to adopt meaningful im-
provements either to the Military Commissions or to the judicial forms of 
any proposed National Security Courts. 
We must understand the nature of what is at stake in these Military 
Commissions, for they are not merely an exercise in United States National 
Security Law.  The Commissions represent an authorization of torture from 
the President, down through the National Security Principals, through the 
War Council, and through the back and forth of the lawyers in the Depart-
ment of Justice, the White House, the Department of Defense, the Depart-
ment of State, and the intelligence agencies.  Entrenched both domestically 
and in our relations with other states, such authorization permeates the 
whole issue of the Military Commissions and any future National Security 
Courts.  To speak of ―intelligence‖ and ―criminal liability,‖ but then refrain 
from speaking openly about that elephant in the room for both the Execu-
tive and the Legislature, is to engage in a level of denial that is especially 
inappropriate for matters as serious as defending the United States against 
its enemies. 
I will go further and state that everything I have read leads me to the 
conclusion that the persons in these branches departed from long estab-
lished United States practice and policy by succumbing to post-9/11 panic.  
They improvised a detainee policy that steered away from the Geneva Con-
ventions and our other international obligations by avoiding traditional 
courts or courts-martial and purposely put people in legal black holes out-
side the United States.  As the law of the lone superpower, the MCA does 
no less than push out to the world a state practice to bring us back to pre-
Geneva Convention standards.  In the end, it is simply a means to carve out 
a new space for a certain group of people who are considered worthy of on-
ly a third class process.  If permitted to go forward, one can expect a foster-
ing of these processes, conceivably leaching from the United States national 
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class process is that unlike courts or courts-martial, these commissions 
demonstrate judicial forms (or ―legalness‖ in the sense of ―truthiness‖ 
coined on the Colbert Report11), not judicial norms of a kind required by 
these kinds of significant processes. 
Judicial forms are the kinds of features and acts that we expect to be 
part of judicial processes: for example, a hearing room, adversaries, a judge, 
a fact finder, motions being made, motions being responded to, decisions on 
motions being made, evidence introduced and the rest of the aspects of a 
process to render a judicial decision.  Judicial norms are more focused on 
the substance of what has gone on in that process to see if a meaningful 
judicial process has occurred.  For example, a show trial can have all of the 
judicial forms of being in a courtroom—a judge, a prosecutor, a defense 
counsel, etc.—but so depart from judicial norms that we understand them as 
sham processes.  The MCA processes are such sham processes. 
III. JUDICIAL FORMS ―LEGALNESS‖ AS OPPOSED TO JUDICIAL NORMS 
The Salim Ahmed Hamdan military commission recently concluded at 
Guantánamo.  This is the second military commission, the first having been 
the subject of a plea agreement made by the Australian detainee David 
Hicks.12  I opposed these military commissions as being fundamentally un-
fair when they were being considered by Congress back in 2006.  The MCA 
appeared to disconnect these detainees from domestic and international law, 
subjecting them to a hermetically sealed process under the MCA alone.  
Since then, in Boumediene, the Supreme Court has pried open this process 
by finding constitutional habeas corpus to be available.13  The contours of 
such habeas relief are now being worked out in the lower courts.14  In light 
of the torture found to have been conducted by the United States and its 
allies on detainees, one of the major questions for these military commis-
sions has been the manner in which coerced evidence and hearsay evidence 
will be treated.  The Hamdan military commission provided the first 
glimpse at how the Military Commissions will handle evidentiary matters in 
an actual trial.  While the MCA represents a great deal of understanding of 
the interstices of U.S. law, because of the departures in the act from what 





  See The Colbert Report: The Word—Truthiness (Comedy Central television broadcast Oct. 18, 
2005), available at http://www.comedycentral.com/videos/index.jhtml?videoId=24039 (link). 
12
  See Agence France-Presse, Terror Detainee Back in Australia, N.Y. TIMES, May, 2007, § 1, at 8, 
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process would be unfair ―as applied.‖ 
The Hamdan military commission confirmed that this process is not 
consistent with fundamental norms of American justice.  I came to this con-
clusion early in the proceedings, through an examination of the Memoran-
dum Order of Judge James Robertson of July 18, 2008 and the Ruling on 
Motions to Suppress of Military Judge Keith Allred two days later on July 
20, 2008.  This Essay walks through these two orders because they appear 
to be foundational for the Hamdan military commission and likely will also 
be foundational for subsequent proceedings with ―bigger fish.‖  My conclu-
sion is that in contrast to courts that provide first class process, or courts-
martial that provide second class justice, these separate and unequal mili-
tary commissions are a third class process for foreigners in an almost her-
metically sealed container.  They are procedures aimed at hiding and 
turning a blind eye to the policy of cruelty towards detainees, not about 
providing meaningful due process. 
A. Judge Robertson and the Structures of American Law Used to Permit 
the Separate and Unequal Third Class Process for Foreigners 
The essence of the perverse nature of the Military Commissions can be 
seen first in the United States District Court‘s examination of Hamdan‘s re-
quest for a preliminary injunction to block the start of the military commis-
sion.  While denying the injunction, Judge James Robertson made several 
important comments in his memorandum order.15  Two significant examples 
of such markers merit attention.  First, he cites the ―fairly permissive stan-
dards for allowing the use of hearsay‖ as one of the ways that the MCA 
commissions depart from the standards generally applied in either typical 
American criminal trials or courts-martial.16  Second, he also notes, in what 
he calls a ―startling‖ departure, that under 10 U.S.C. § 948r(c), evidence ob-
tained by ―coercion‖ may be used against the defendant so long as the mili-
tary judge decides that its admission is in the interest of justice and that is 
has ―sufficient‖ probative value.17 
Judge Robertson specifically contrasts 10 U.S.C § 948r(c) with the Su-
preme Court‘s decision in Chambers v. Florida,18 in which the Court re-
versed a conviction and excluded evidence obtained through five days of 
coercive interrogations.  I find it striking that Judge Robertson asks us to 
compare the Military Commission process put in place in 2006 with the 





  Hamdan v. Gates, No. 04-CV-1519-JR, 2008 WL 2780911 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008), available at 
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tice Black delivered the opinion of the Court by starting with a phrase pain-
ful to read today: 
The grave question presented by the petition for certiorari, granted in forma 
pauperis, is whether proceedings in which confessions were utilized, and 
which culminated in sentences of death upon four young negro men in the 
State of Florida, failed to afford the safeguard of that due process of law guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.19 
In harkening back to the Jim Crow era, to a case in which African-
Americans in the South during segregation were abused in an interrogation, 
I believe that Judge Robertson is carefully reminding the United States of a 
time when hysteria led to profoundly unfair processes.  Judge Robertson‘s 
marker should haunt us as we examine this separate and unequal third class 
process for foreigners—a process without the safeguards of Article III 
courts or courts-martial. 
In the MCA‘s structure for review of convictions, Judge Robertson 
does recognize an improvement from the President‘s Military Order.  How-
ever, he notes the tendentious question of whether the two charges against 
Hamdan—conspiracy in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b) (28) and for pro-
viding material support for terrorism in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 950 
v(b)(25)—are actually war crimes traditionally addressed by Military 
Commissions or, implicitly, new constructs inserted by Congress.20  The 
concern of course is whether these charges violate the Constitution‘s Ex 
Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, or Define and Punish Clauses,21 or, more 
broadly, the question of the principal of legality.  He also discusses other 
claims of Hamdan‘s: that the MCA violates the equal protection component 
of Fifth Amendment due process, and that hearsay evidence and evidence 
obtained through coercion violates his Geneva Convention and due process 
rights. 
The government‘s purpose is to ensure that all these matters are dealt 
with inside the Military Commission structure, which contains the court-
stripping language of 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b).  Consistent with canons of 
avoiding of questions of constitutionality, Judge Robertson ultimately res-
ists addressing Hamdan‘s constitutional challenge to the court-stripping 
language.  His analysis distinguishes the posture of this case (a challenge to 
MCA jurisdiction) from that in Boumediene (a challenge to detention).22  He 





  309 U.S. at 227 (citations omitted). 
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  Justice Stevens raised the point when questioning the law of war nature of the conspiracy charge 
in the President‘s Military Order in 2006 in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2779–80 (2006).  
From the perspective of international law, Congress stating that such a crime is part of the laws of war in 
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22
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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  COLLOQUY  
 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/32/ 95 
tional hearing Hamdan had before the commission, and further, he cites 
Hamdan‘s opportunity to avail himself of the procedural processes of notice 
of charges, of discovery, prospective ability to call and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and the opportunities to challenge hearsay and to introduce exculpa-
tory evidence.23  Judge Robertson notes that Hamdan‘s Suspension Clause 
arguments are not completely covered by Boumediene and are complex in 
their potential deviation from traditional habeas corpus review. 
Most importantly, Judge Robertson relies on the comity-based absten-
tion doctrine of Schlesinger v. Councilman24 in this military commission 
setting where a foreigner is being charged.  Recognizing that Councilman 
concerned a court-martial proceeding against a U.S. service member and 
not a military commission (the military commissions having been promul-
gated by the Legislature) he concludes that considerations of comity mili-
tate for abstention by the courts.  Judge Robertson found inapplicable the 
Councilman exception, according to which defendants may raise ―substan-
tial arguments that a military tribunal lacks personal jurisdiction over 
them,‖ and denied the motion for preliminary injunction.25  Hamdan is not 
appealing this decision, so the scene now shifts us to the Military Commis-
sion. 
In sum, Judge Robertson in dicta raises significant warnings about the 
Military Commission process.  He notes that the ―eyes of the world are on 
Guantánamo Bay‖ in denying the preliminary injunction.26  Since that deci-
sion it is understood that Hamdan‘s lawyers are not intending to appeal this 
decision so the military commission has moved forward and the scene now 
shifts us to Guantánamo. 
B. Two Days Later—Military Commission “Legalness” 
Two days after Judge Robertson‘s opinion, the Military Judge Keith 
Allred ruled on a motion to suppress statements based on coercive interro-
gation practices and a motion to suppress statements based on the Fifth 
Amendment.27  The military judge addressed the question of whether Fifth 
Amendment rights are available to detainees in Guantánamo.  The analysis 
reveals his view that Boumediene was a narrow opinion concerning habeas 





  Id. at *5–6. 
24
  420 U.S. 738 (1975) (abstention for comity reasons by federal courts when court-martial engaged 
against U.S. serviceman). 
25
  Hamdan, No. 04-CV-1519-JR, 2008 WL 2780911, at *7. 
26
  Id. 
27
  Ruling on Motion to Suppress Statements Based on Coercive Interrogation Practices and Motion 
to Suppress Statements Based on Fifth Amendment, United States v. Hamdan, D-029 and D-044 (Mili-
tary Comm‘n, July 20, 2008) [hereinafter Hamdan, Ruling on Motions to Suppress Statements], availa-
ble at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Ruling%20on%20Motion%20to%20Suppress%2029%20and%20D-
044%20Ruling%201%20(2).pdf (link).  The next paragraphs summarize the analysis of that ruling. 
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should, like habeas corpus, apply in Guantánamo.  At that point, one cannot 
help but sense a tightening of the MCA‘s hermetic seals around Hamdan. 
The crux of the analysis is the truncated evaluation of the Insular Cas-
es28 and the inapposite discussion of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.29  
On the Insular Cases, one phrase sums up the essence of the analysis: 
―While the Court has since decided that some of these rights are indeed 
fundamental, these cases illustrate that the Court has not traditionally found 
the Constitution applicable abroad.‖30 
Essentially, Judge Allred considers Hamdan‘s rights to be akin to those 
of persons in the Philippines at the turn of the 19th to 20th century.  He 
does so, effectively disregarding all of the significant developments in Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence since that time.  Omitted is any analysis of the 
history through which Fifth Amendment rights became fundamental rights.  
First, the ruling does recognize that the language in the Insular Cases stat-
ing that the Fifth Amendment applied only in federal courts has been super-
seded by decisions in which it was made applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.31 Second, the analysis does not emphasize the fun-
damental nature of those rights as demonstrated by their application in an 
unincorporated territory, such as Puerto Rico.32  By casting aside these de-
velopments in the fundamental nature of the Fifth Amendment, both in the 
states and in an unincorporated territory, the judge essentially ratifies the 
political branches‘ efforts to create a less noble process at Guantánamo 
where coerced testimony can be admitted more easily. 
Rather than halting his analysis in the Philippines at the turn of the 
19th to 20th century, Judge Allred might have taken either of two paths: (1) 
Taking an ―outward-in approach,‖ he could have discussed how the Fifth 
Amendment has been applied offshore, starting with the Insular Cases in 
the Philippines, moving to Hawaii—before and after statehood, then to 
Puerto Rico, then to the application to the states of the Fifth Amendment 





  See id., slip op. at 9–10 (discussing the Insular Cases—cases from the turn of the 19th to 20th 
century concerning the applicability as of right of constitutional protections such as the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments to unincorporated U.S. territories such as the Philippines). 
29
  See id. at 10 (discussing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)). 
30
  Id. 
31
  See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination).  See generally, JOHN E. 
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.6 (7th ed. 2004). 
32
  Other authorities provide a broader vision of the question of the experience with unincorporated 
territories.  See generally EDIBERTO ROMÁN, THE OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES: AN INTERNATIONAL 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES‘ NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH 
CENTURY ISLAND CONQUESTS (2006); PEDRO A. MALAVET, AMERICA‘S COLONY: THE POLITICAL AND 
CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO (2004).  For a general introduc-
tion to the law of United States Territories and Affiliated Jurisdictions see STANLEY K. LAUGHLIN, JR., 
THE LAW OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIES AND AFFILIATED JURISDICTIONS (1995).  I am indebted to 
Professor Pedro A. Malavet for drawing my attention to the rich work on the Insular Cases and their 
consequences. 
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that context.  (2) Alternatively, taking an ―inward-out approach,‖ Judge Al-
lred could have started from the Fifth Amendment in the Federal courts, 
moved to the application to the states of the Fifth Amendment through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, then to application of the Fifth Amendment in an 
unincorporated territory such as Puerto Rico, and finally arrived at Guantá-
namo.  What seems inexcusable is not examining at greater length the 
changed nature of the Fifth Amendment right since the early 20th century in 
the Insular Cases.33 
As to Verdugo-Urquidez, the discussion is also problematic as the 
Fourth Amendment analysis with regard to Mexico is inapposite in a situa-
tion of armed conflict, and the Fifth Amendment analysis, largely based on 
Johnson v. Eisenstrager,34 focuses on extraterritorial application in China 
and Germany after convictions of war crimes.35  Unlike the situation of a 
sovereign state like Mexico in Vergugo-Urquidez and the occupied zones of 
China and Germany in Eisentrager, as recognized in Boumediene, the com-
plete treaty and de facto control of the United States in a peaceful Guantá-
namo is on a different footing. 
Moreover, this was a hearing for the war crimes trial and not in the ha-
beas corpus proceeding after a conviction.  Thus, the Fifth Amendment 
stakes could not be higher.  At a minimum, one would expect that the Mili-
tary Judge would tread more carefully on the fundamental nature of the 
Fifth Amendment right in this context rather than treat such rights in such a 
dismissive manner.  While Guantánamo is not America, it is abundantly 
clear that Guantánamo is enough of a de facto America for purposes of 
United States effective control for the Supreme Court that fundamental 
Constitutional rights should not be denied without more substantial bases.36 
It is regretful that the military judge does not analogize for the Fifth 
Amendment from the majority‘s analysis of the factors for the extension of 
the writ to Guantánamo in Boumediene.37  While he cites to Boumediene, it 
is only done to focus on words like ―practicalities‖ rather than on the 
Court‘s concerns with fundamental rights being provided to noncitizens in 





  See Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195, slip op. at 25–34 (U.S. June 12, 2008) (discussing the de-
velopment of the extraterritorial application of constitutional provisions, including the Fifth Amend-
ment, since the Insular Cases). 
34
  339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
35
  See Hamdan, Ruling on Motions to Suppress Statements, D-029 and D-044, slip op. at 9–10. 
36
  See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding that federal courts have statutory jurisdic-
tion to hear habeas petitions filed by detainees at Guantánamo); Boumediene, No. 06-1195, slip op. at 
25–34 (―[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formal-
ism.‖). 
37
  See Boumediene, No. 06-1195, slip op. at 25–34 (―[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objec-
tive factors and practical concerns, not formalism.‖). 
38
  See Hamdan, Ruling on Motions to Suppress Statements, D-029 and D-044, slip op. at 11–14. 
39
  In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463–65 (1891) (holding that trials of citizens or noncitizens before a 
consular tribunal in accordance with a treaty covering offenses committed in a foreign country are con-
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in Boumediene, military tribunals are not necessary on Guantánamo and 
Americans are not subject to the tribunals.40  This difference might raise 
concerns about the fairness of the process.  In addition, with regard to the 
Insular Cases, that the Philippines were soon destined for independence 
while there is no similar path foreseen for Guantánamo also militates for a 
stronger version of Constitutional protections.  Finally, that there are signif-
icant allegations of ill treatment that come from credible sources41 should 
have tempered greatly the Military Judge‘s willingness to not interpret the 
Fifth Amendment to apply in this setting.  Things like the introduction of 
―clean teams‖—interrogators who had no knowledge or participation in tor-
ture coming after other interrogators had tortured—should have been ex-
amined more openly to get at the substance of the balancing of national 
security concerns with fundamental rights.  Maybe he was hesitant as a mil-
itary judge to exercise the full breadth of power that the Supreme Court‘s 
Boumediene decision permitted.  It is precisely that lack of judicial tough-
ness with regard to the Fifth Amendment and coercion in the military 
judge‘s exercise of discretion that seals the fate of Hamdan.  And in that 
manner, the military judge acquiesces to coercion—as have, in my opinion, 
too many Americans. 
The military judge then turns to a practicalities analysis and essentially 
                                                                                                                           
stitutional). 
40
  The discussion of Ross in Boumediene highlights the practical considerations that justified the use 
of consular tribunals in Ross: 
The petitioner in Ross was a sailor serving on an American merchant vessel in Japanese waters 
who was tried before an American consular tribunal for the murder of a fellow crewman. 140 U.S. 
at 459, 479.  The Ross court held that the petitioner, who was a British subject, had no rights under 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  Id. at 464.  The petitioner‘s citizenship played no role in the 
disposition of the case, however.  The Court assumed (consistent with the maritime custom of the 
time) that Ross had all the rights of a similarly situated American citizen.  Id. at 479 (noting that 
Ross was ―under the protection and subject to the laws of the United States equally with the sea-
man who was native born‖).   
Boumediene, No. 06-1195, slip op. at 30–31. 
Unlike the consular tribunals in Ross, the military commissions apply only to noncitizens and do not 
apply US law equally to Americans and non-Americans, are not the result of long established custom, 
and are hard to justify as the best possible means to achieve justice for these cases in a situation where 
the American or foreigner is not in the United States but is in a territory over which the United States 
has effective control and de facto sovereignty.  Moreover, the practical reasons in custom for consular 
tribunals in 1891 related to time and travel simply do not exist for the Guantanamo detainees.  U.S. 
courts are just a couple of hours away and U.S. courts-martial could be held at Guantanamo without any 
significant practical difficulty. 
41
  See GLENN FINE, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE 
FBI‘S INVOLVEMENT IN AND OBSERVATIONS OF DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN GUANTANAMO BAY, 
AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ 15 (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0805/final.pdf (dis-
cussing reports by FBI agents of ―aggressive interrogation techniques‖ being used at Guantánamo) 
(link); Jennifer Schuessler, A History of Abuse in the War on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2008, at E1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/22/books/22schuessler.html (reviewing JANE MAYER, 
THE DARK SIDE (2008)) (―A secret Red Cross report given to the C.I.A. last year and described to Ms. 
Mayer said some of these techniques were categorically torture. (An internal C.I.A. review, she writes, 
was on its way to reaching the same conclusion in 2004 before Mr. Cheney derailed it.)‖) (link). 
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defers to the Congressional approach, which expressly and consciously de-
nies unlawful enemy combatants the right to be warned that their statements 
may be used against them and the right to have an unwarned statement sup-
pressed.42  The military judge supports this Congressional position by refe-
rencing procedures from two civil law-based international criminal tribunals 
and the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and concludes that 
the MCA provides enough process.43  This would seem to be the wrong an-
swer. 
First, when adhering to the language of Article 5 of the Geneva Con-
vention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III), the questions are (1) 
whether Hamdan should have been entitled to Prisoner of War (POW) Sta-
tus and (2) whether the tighter interrogation rules associated with that status 
should have applied, as opposed to those based on Common Article 3 
grounds.  We should remember that Hamdan was captured on the battlefield 
of Afghanistan and, in case of doubt, he should have been provided GCIII 
POW protections.44  The ruling makes brief reference to Hamdan‘s having 
had process in the CSRT (Combatant Status Review Tribunal), and that this 
is otherwise adequate for GC III Article 5 hearing purposes.45  However, the 
fact that prior to that hearing the higher POW protections should have pro-
tected Hamdan‘s statements belies that interpretation. 
Second, in the event we remain in Common Article 3, Judge Allred‘s 
analysis still falls short in its evaluation of whether the MCA is a regularly 
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees recognized as indis-
pensable by civilized peoples.  Judge Allred defers to the Congressional 
pronouncement in the MCA, thereby accepting its conformity with the 
Common Article 3 standard.  He does not examine any other parts of the 
Geneva Conventions, presumably because the MCA actually prohibits as-
sertions of the Geneva Conventions.46  Yet, it would seem advisable that the 
peculiar qualities of the MCA process would merit some evaluation of its 
compliance with Common Article 3.  In a context where a policy of cruelty 





  Hamdan, Ruling on Motions to Suppress Statements, Summary and Decision, D-029 and D-044, 
slip op. at 12, 13, 15–16. 
43
  Id. at 12–13. 
44
  See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e6
8 (stating that all prisoners of war should be afforded protections under the Geneva Conventions and that 
whenever there is doubt about a detainees proper status, he should ―enjoy the protection of the present 
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.‖) (link). 
45
  See Hamdan, Ruling on Motions to Suppress Statements, D-029 and D-044, slip op. at 11 (Mili-
tary Comm‘n, July 20, 2008). 
46
  Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g) (2006) (―No alien unlawful enemy com-
batant subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as 
a source of rights.‖). 
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Judge Robertson, Judge Allred felt his hands tied by precedent.47 
On the other hand, given how the Fifth Amendment has become part 
and parcel of every regularly constituted court in the United States, its ab-
sence in these proceedings seems curious.  To the extent that Common Ar-
ticle 3 calls for normal domestic law processes, the absence on practical 
grounds of Fifth Amendment rights is shocking.  However, Judge Allred 
does not discuss the difference between this type of proceeding and the 
court or court-martial proceedings in which the Fifth Amendment right is 
sacrosanct.  In his willingness to defer to Congress—which calculated in 
collaboration with the Executive to further this policy of cruelty48—the mili-
tary judge reminds me of the judge in the state court deferring to a local 
policy of cruelty with the African-American defendant in Chambers v. 
Florida.  In this case, it is a foreigner relegated to a third class process.  The 





  See Hamdan v. Gates, No. 04-CV-1519-JR, 2008 WL 2780911, at *7 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008) 
(―Where both Congress and the President have expressly decided when Article III review is to occur, the 
courts should be wary of disturbing their judgment.‖). 
48
  It is to be remembered that the Military Commission Act of 2006 was developed in response to 
the 2006 Hamdan decision which, among other things, stated that at a minimum Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions applied to the Al Qaeda persons held by the United States.  Hamdan v. Rums-
feld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2793–98 (2006).  As the four top Judge Advocate Generals of the uniformed ser-
vices testified in the summer of 2006, violations of Common Article 3 had occurred in detainee 
treatment: 
Senator Graham: Would you agree that some of the techniques we have authorized clearly violate 
Common Article 3? 
General Rives:  Some of the techniques that have been authorized and used in the past have vi-
olated Common Article 3. 
Senator Graham: Does every one agree with that statement? Affirmative response of all con-
cerned.‖ SEN. GRAHAM: Would you agree that some of the techniques we have authorized clear-
ly violate Common Article 3? 
General Rives:  Some of the techniques that have been authorized and used in the past have vi-
olated Common Article 3. 
Senator Graham: Does every one agree with that statement? Affirmative response of all concerned. 
Military Commissions in Light of the Supreme Court Decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Hearing Be-
fore the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 109th Cong. 67 (2006) (testimony of all of the Military Judge 
Advocate Generals).  Furthermore, congressional leaders had been informed of the techniques.  See Ben-
jamin G. Davis, Congress, Torture and Romain Gary’s “Chien Blanc”, JURIST, Dec. 10, 2007, 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/12/congress-torture-and-romain-garys-chien.php (referring to 
press reports that week and to earlier dissimulation by a member of Congress to me) (link).  A timeline 
shows the intimate relationship between the admission of coerced interrogation and the introduction of 
the Military Commission Act to Congress on the same day.  For an intricate discussion of some of the 
interstices of the collaboration see Gregory S. McNeal. An Abbreviated Legislative History and Timeline 
Regarding the Development of Section 949(b) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (Aug. 8, 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/gregorymcneal/17 (link).  The watered 
down provisions concerning the Geneva Conventions, the War Crimes Act, and the retroactive applica-
tion of the MCA are evidence of the collaboration by the Executive and Congress to change the rules to 
hopefully avoid any difficulties as a result of the policy of cruelty.  The Enemy Combatant Detention 
Review Act recently proposed in light of Boumediene is a further example of this collaborative effort by 
the Executive and some members of Congress. 
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failing to do that, it fails to meet fundamental American judicial norms.  
The Court should have been less deferential because this policy of cruelty 
departed from the foundational norms of our country.  With the policy of 
cruelty, as the Supreme Court did by not deferring in Boumediene, it would 
be more consistent with the full powers of the Judiciary (let alone the full 
power of the jurisdiction of a state to adjudicate as a matter of international 
law) to include more grandeur d’esprit in the analysis and less deference to 
the complicit Congress.  Otherwise, the Judge appears to be limiting the un-
favorable consequences for the prosecution of the official policy of cruelty.  
As Judge Robertson wrote in his memorandum opinion, ―[t]he eyes of the 
world are on Guantánamo Bay.‖49  Letting Congressional acquiescence to 
torture denature an American judicial procedure should be anathema to the 
military judge. 
The military judge selects two international criminal tribunals (Yugos-
lavia and Rwanda) that derive their processes to a great extent from the civil 
law tradition.50  With all due respect to Judge Allred, his approach appears 
to cherry-pick sections from a couple of processes that operate on the inter-
national plane and support his inclination to deny to Hamdan a fundamental 
norm of American law.  Yet he is aware that the civil law systems share 
with American law the fundamental concern with the procurement of testi-
mony through coercion.  The result is to provide a process to foreigners in 
the MCA different than that afforded persons in the courts or courts-martial 
processes, and, in particular, with regard to an aspect that touches on fun-
damental American rights and fundamental international norms against tor-
ture.  Read as an exclusive process for foreigners, the MCA raises concerns 
by not providing national treatment—treatment of foreigners and Ameri-
cans alike before the law—to these foreigners, and by potentially falling 
short of meeting the international minimum standard of justice by treating 
these foreigners in a manner that subverts the jus cogens peremptory norm 
against torture.  The possibility of coerced testimony being admissible 
makes these concerns especially grave. 
I am also concerned that this exclusive process for foreigners is a tri-
bunal d’exception in which Americans cannot be tried.  This different 
treatment of Americans and foreigners is not inevitable; the United States 
courts and courts-martial could in fact address these cases.   
We have seen the resilience of courts most recently in a major terror-
ism trial here in Toledo, Ohio.51  While there are issues on appeal, it did ap-
pear that the court process was capable of balancing the key interests while 
providing and appearing to provide justice.  The major attraction of placing 





  Hamdan, No. 04-CV-1519-JR, 2008 WL 2780911, *7. 
50
  See Hamdan, Ruling on Motions to Suppress Statements, D-029 and D-044, slip op. at 13 (Mili-
tary Comm‘n, July 20, 2008). 
51
  United States v. Amawi, 552 F. Supp. 2d 669 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
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question as to their independence and neutrality in a process that has many 
traditions—it is not a process of remaking the wheel like the MCA.  As to 
the courts-martial, these are the courts that deal with the military, and the 
jurisprudence developed will draw from the more stable form of military 
judicial process rather than being made up on the fly.  To use Professor 
McNeal‘s terms, the executive forum-discretion would be reduced to two 
traditional forums that are both available and substantial creatures of judi-
cial norms.  Those presiding over these forums have experience in dealing 
with all the concerns addressed by Professor McNeal.  I do not want to mi-
nimize the significance of the difficulties that the torture has caused us and 
will cause such tribunals, but I respect their ability to see clearly. 
This exclusive forum for foreigners does not provide foreigners with 
national treatment.  Also, because of the link between these protections 
from the consequences of coerced testimony and torture, I believe that 
Judge Allred failed to apply an international minimum standard of justice. 
Under the lower standard, the military judge goes on to accept and ex-
clude various statements.52  His analysis gives the impression that he care-
fully weighed the information provided.  But, we must understand that this 
careful weighing takes place only after excluding Fifth Amendment appli-
cability, after giving great deference to a Congressional approach that 
masks the policy of cruelty, and after emphasizing the practicality of the 
circumstances.53  To the untrained reader, this will all appear to be a reason-
able process.  But, one who has some sense of what the opinion excludes 
begins to understand the brilliant perversity of these Potemkin trials for fo-
reigners.  But, while brilliant, these procedures fail to meet U.S. and Inter-
national judicial standards. 
It is beyond the scope of this Reply to highlight all of the flaws of the 
MCA processes—they are legion.  Nevertheless, I hope that this short Re-
ply removes any mask of respectability that may cover these procedures.  
The MCA processes are ingenious and represent a great deal of understand-
ing of the interstices of U.S. law, but they are inconsistent with fundamental 
judicial norms of the United States.  Changing the prosecutor or convening 
authority will not correct these fundamental flaws because such flaws are 
inherent to this system.  Of course, when the convictions roll in, the mes-
sage will be that these foreigners got more process than they gave their vic-
tims.  That is the language of a small town in the south in 1940 with an 
African-American on trial for murder, and not the language of process con-
sistent with fundamental American values and international standards.  We 





  See Hamdan, Ruling on Motions to Suppress Statements, D-029 and D-044, slip op. at 15–16. 
53
  See id. at 8–14. 
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IV. REFORM IS MEANINGLESS 
I wish I could be hopeful that some new Executive and Legislature will 
correct these compounded legal and policy flaws.  But absent meaningful 
accountability on the part of the executive and legislative leaders who 
worked together to institute the torture and who seek to hide behind these 
military commissions or a future national security court,54 I think such hope 
is unwarranted.55  These actors are human and we should understand these 
acts for what they are—attempts at self-preservation and avoidance of ac-
countability for the crimes they permitted.  Whether operating in the do-
mestic or international field, and whether operating in the public or private 
sphere, the interest of these actors is to make sure that the legal regime for 
those people subject to the Military Commissions is third class. 
Reform is meaningless.  The pressures on the political convening au-
thority are hydraulic.  If the Convening Authority were to be a military 
convening authority in the chain of command, the pressure would focus on 
that military convening authority (the old Kiss Up, Kick Down scenario).  
Military generals are unable, or unwilling, to put their ―stars on the table.‖  
An example of this is the action by then Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Richard Myers, who blocked a legal review of detention policies 
requested by all four services.  As detailed in the testimony of Jane G. Dal-
ton, Retired Rear Admiral in the U.S. Navy, to the Senate Committee on the 
Armed Services of June 17, 2008,56 this episode suggests that having a mili-
tary convening authority may not be enough to protect judicial norms for 
alien unlawful enemy combatants.  At least, this is the case in the face of 
those exercising pressure to deviate from fundamental rules of law, to ena-
ble and hide torture, and to seek self-preservation for their acts. 
In addition, even the transparent regulation process can be subject to 
direct and indirect pressure to co-opt or capture the regulation drafting 





  See generally JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR 
TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008); PHILIPPE SANDS, THE TORTURE TEAM: 
RUMSFELD‘S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES (2008); JORDAN PAUST, BEYOND THE 
LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION‘S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE ―WAR‖ ON TERROR (2007); Davis, 
Congress, Torture and Romain Gary’s “Chien Blanc”, supra note 48. 
55
  To understand the extent of this impropriety, we should keep in mind that even the flawed Quirin 
military commission in World War II appears better than these Military Commissions, because in the 
Quirin commission there was no torture in the processes. For a detailed examination of the Quirin com-
mission, see LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2005) in which no hint 
of torture is made in the highly critical analysis of the impoverished Quirin military commission set up 
under President Roosevelt. 
56
  Origins of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Armed 
Services, 110th Cong. (2008) (Testimony of Admiral Jane G. Dalton, USN (Ret.)).  Senator Reed ques-
tioned Admiral Dalton: ―[Y]ou were essentially told by General Myers to stop any formal legal analysis 
to reach a formal conclusion. Is that correct?‖  Admiral Dalton responded: ―I was told to stop the broad-
based legal review that would—and policy review that would have involved the services and the other 
agencies like Fort Huachuca and DIA.  I was told to stop the broad-based analysis.‖  Id. 
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gress‘s manifest inability to understand the relation between our treatment 
of these foreigners and the treatment of Americans accused in foreign coun-
tries is significant.  Additionally, there is simply no perceived interest for a 
Congressperson to do anything that risks being considered ―soft on terror-
ism.‖  Finally, the obstacles noted for a national security court appear to be 
not so much obstacles, but rather consequences of the policy of cruelty. 
To state those consequences more specifically: the nonprosecution pa-
radox is clearly a result of the difficulty of introducing evidence from 
coerced interrogations in normal courts and courts-martial.  ―Intelligence 
problems‖ is a euphemism at least in part for information procured through 
coerced interrogations.  ―Challenges posed by accommodating speedy trial 
rights in light of security clearances and secured facilities‖ is really more 
about the secret, incommunicado detention and torture of detainees to get 
information that compromises their underlying rights and the high secrecy 
sought to protect these acts from being brought to light. ―Authorities go-
verning the methods by which intelligence is gathered and used‖ is again a 
subtle reference to evidence gathered through the policy of cruelty.  ―The 
phenomenon of executive forum-discretion‖ is really about the effort of the 
executive to put cases in a forum where the policy of cruelty will not be 
brought to light in a way that risks accountability.  All these obstacles are 
derived from the policy of cruelty. 
By removing the policy of cruelty and returning to traditional baselines 
on human rights, the result is to make such a court an anachronism in search 
of a problem.  Ultimately, the problem is not in the vagaries of courts or 
courts-martial, but rather in the willingness to put in place a policy of cruel-
ty that violates both U.S. and international law. 
There is another aspect of the MCA that disturbs me.  In addition to in-
adequate judicial processes, the MCA serves as a further form of hydraulic 
pressure on the detainees.  One senses the pressure that would lead detai-
nees—ostensibly in free will—to plead guilty to horrendous things once 
they realize there is no hope for them in this process.  To pick one, Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed has confessed to many things.  It is widely known that 
these confessions were made in a context after torture and one in which his 
two children were being held incommunicado by the United States.57  Can 
those sorts of pressures be analyzed meaningfully in this process?  I doubt 
it.  Take even the process of torture and then peace.  Do the statements in 
the peaceful periods bear the mark of the earlier torture?58  I find it hard to 





  Olga Craig, CIA Holds Young Sons of Captured Al-Qaeda Chief, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 9, 
2003, at 2, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1424123/CIA-
holds-young-sons-of-captured-al-Qaeda-chief.html (link). 
58
  See Hamdan, Ruling on Motions to Suppress Statements, D-029 and D-044, slip op. at 15 (ans-
wering this question in the negative, at least as a procedural matter for the military commissions: 
―Command influence ‗in the air‘ is not enough.  Impact on a particular trial must be shown.‖). 
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room when the video of one of his ostensibly peaceful Afghanistan interro-
gations was played.59  What is missing from the tape?  I also worry that de-
cisions made in light of Hamdan‘s circumstances are actually efforts to use 
the military commission proceedings involving the low-level driv-
er/bodyguard to create and solidify new standards that leave space open for 
evidence that is still to come in other cases with ―bigger fish.‖  For the eigh-
ty triable detainees, I suspect that the MCA is part and parcel of bringing 
them to a level of despair significant enough to coerce guilty pleas.  The 
opaque process around each confession—what is off stage, so to speak—is 
disturbing.  Judicial forms may be followed, but what will have taken place 
is judicial noise—not an application of judicial norms. 
V. A CITIZEN‘S PERSPECTIVE—LESSONS DURING 9/11 
This lack of confidence in the ability of those acting from the Execu-
tive or Legislature to meaningfully provide further improvised legislation 
leads me to suggest that reform is not the right approach.  Rather than think 
of reform as further improvisation, I suggest that we step back to a third ap-
proach.  It is frequently bandied about that persons have a pre-9/11 mindset 
or that everything changed after 9/11.  I have written in other places on the 
inappropriate nature of that split.60  However, in preparing this paper, I 
came across a reminder of a third place for this debate: a citizen‘s perspec-
tive during 9/11.  It is in that moment that I may have found the suggestions 
for the proper course of action.  The citizen‘s perspective that I describe 
will necessarily be only a microcosm.  However, in rereading an e-mail I 
wrote on September 12, 2001 describing my Dispute Resolution class on 
9/11, I am struck again by what that discussion revealed about how we 
might proceed today. 
The Dispute Resolution class was at Texas Wesleyan University 
School of Law and consisted of about forty students.  It started at about 
10:15 New York time, so the television was reporting the hijackings live, 
the pictures of the bombed World Trade Center buildings were on the air, 
and we were deep into the period before the towers came crashing down.  
We started the class in a somber mood as you would imagine. 
We had a moment of silence for all the people who were lost.  We then 
went on with looking at questions from our textbook.  One of the questions 
was about negotiating with Terrorists in the Middle East who held hostages, 
and we had a long discussion on this one. 
I felt it was hard on them but I asked them to imagine that President 
Bush was coming back to Washington and they were going to meet with 





  Carol Rosenberg, Bin Laden’s Driver Evasive in Interrogation Video, MIAMI HERALD, July 24, 
2008, at A3, available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/100/story/45343.html (link). 
60
  See, e.g., Benjamin G. Davis, A Citizen Observer’s View of the U.S. Approach to the “War on 
Terrorism”, 17 TRANSNAT‘L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 465, 465–79 (2008). 
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Many students felt that there was no place for alternative dispute resolution 
and negotiation and the approach should be to find and kill the people who 
did this.  I talked with them about the Clausewitz notion that war is diplo-
macy by other means.61  I told them that we, like President Bush, were all 
under the emotions of the horrible events, but that even with emotion at that 
level, one still has to think rationally about the appropriate next steps.  I 
asked them to tell me what they would say to President Bush.  Student res-
ponses varied greatly. 
One student said that he would look at how to make these types of at-
tacks cease and start to think about options.  I asked him what he would do 
if the terrorists asked for $1 million and whether he would pay it.  The stu-
dent was not sure but said that he would try to find ways to create options.  
Another student pointed out that we were not in a hostage setting, but were 
in a situation after the bombings, where there is no place to negotiate.  
Another student—one who had previously served in the Navy—said that ra-
ther than striking out we would have to go back to our principles and de-
termine from there the best way to proceed.  Another student‘s view was 
that when people have nothing to lose they will do these terrible things, so 
we must find a way for the people to have a stake in what is going on in or-
der to stop these types of things from happening.  Another student said that 
this was a situation where people acted on principles and there was no way 
to change their beliefs.  Another student started to give a history of Middle 
East relations.  I asked him for his recommendation and he did not say.  
Another student referred to the movie Thirteen Days and the Cuban missile 
crisis and said each cabinet member would have their own agenda.  I then 
asked her, knowing that each person would have an agenda, how she would 
proceed if she were the National Security Advisor.  She said she would rec-
ommend striking at someone.  There were other points, but this is generally 
how the discussion went.  As class ended, I was told that both of the World 
Trade Center towers had fallen down. 
As I have looked back on that class and gotten past the parts where 
persons urged us to strike out (we have had wars and the policy of cruelty 
for that), I remain struck by the comments of the former Navy member.  He 
suggested, that rather than striking out, we should return to our principles, 
and from these principles determine the best way to proceed.  Surely the 
Fifth Amendment protections form part of our principles, and govern our 
treatment of persons hailed in front of an American military commission.  
Surely that commission must comport with standards developed in our 
courts and courts-martial.  Surely we must provide real and not ersatz 
process.  Surely, we can provide an international standard of process consis-
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have a steerage class to hide our policy of cruelty.  Instead, our legal system 
should assure us that, whatever course we take, we are adhering to judicial 
norms whereby a defendant has the possibility to be acquitted.62  We Amer-
icans surely can respond to the call of Hersch Lauterpacht in a lecture given 
at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, on 
May 27, 1941 during some of the darkest days of World War II: 
Constructive thought in the field of international organization must continue to 
be based on the view that while the protection of true sovereignty, conceived 
as independence of the power of other States, is the main purpose of interna-
tional law, its reality has been thwarted by certain manifestations of State so-
vereignty and that a surrender or limitation of some aspects of that sovereignty 
are still the essential condition of the effectiveness of the Law of Nations.  The 
fulfillment of that condition depends not only on the acquiescence but on the 
determination of the individual citizen.63 
CONCLUSION—BACK TO FIRST AND SECOND CLASS PROCESS 
The structural response by Professor McNeal strikes at important 
symptoms, but, still, these are only symptoms of what is wrong with the 
MCA.  The MCA seems to be a post-hoc structure to wrap up the drastic 
consequences of the policy of cruelty—it seems tailor-made for that task 
and not for the purpose of rendering justice. 
The inability of the Executive and the Legislature to establish a proce-
dure that meets judicial norms leaves us with only two places in which to 
deal with these cases: traditional Article III courts or courts-martial.  Over 
the past seven years, as noted above, the Article III courts have demonstrat-
ed a resiliency and an adaptability to the problems associated with terrorism 
cases.64  Over and over, with regard to military commissions, we have seen 
the Supreme Court willing to step in and point out that it has not been 
duped.  We should not let ourselves be duped by the MCA. 
Since I first began writing this piece in late July 2008, the Hamdan 
military commission has rendered its verdict and sentenced Mr. Hamdan to 
sixty-six months of imprisonment with credit given for sixty-one months al-
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have a sense of any members of the American political class having any 
concern about the quality of the process Mr. Hamdan received.  Persons 
have spoken in praise of the fairmindedness of the military jurors and the 
judge in the case.66 
I have no doubt that the Hamdan jurors are fine persons of high cali-
ber, but having good people acting as judges does not make a judicial 
process consistent with core American values.  Rather, it adds the United 
States to a long list of countries that use ersatz mechanisms to try their per-
ceived enemies.  This brief Essay is my modest way to speak to my fellow 
citizens and ask them to ponder what America is losing in terms of reputa-
tion and stature by these third class processes that dissimulate crimes of tor-
ture rather than condemn them.  For this American citizen, this third class 
process is not good enough, for it renews with the worst of prior American 
judicial process, not the best.  Would that this plea be heard. 
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